UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JUSTIN CHARLES MASS, SR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 10-C-29

DAVID BETH,

Defendant.

ORDER

The plaintiff, Justin Charles Mass, Sr., who is currently incarcerated at the Dodge Correctional Institution, filed a *pro se* civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter comes before the court on the plaintiff's petition to proceed *in forma pauperis*.

The plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of \$350.00 for this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). If a prisoner does not have the money to pay the filing fee, he can request leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. The plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of \$0.56.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, if the

prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); *Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink*, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327. "Malicious," although sometimes treated as a synonym for "frivolous," "is more usefully construed as intended to harass." *Lindell v. McCallum*, 352 F.3d 1107, 1109-10 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, the plaintiff is required to provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead specific facts and his statement need only "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, a complaint that offers "labels and conclusions" or "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, ____ U.S. ____, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555). To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

"that is plausible on its face." *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Id.* (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555.

In considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts should follow the principles set forth in *Twombly* by first, "identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. *Id.* If there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must, second, "assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." *Id.*

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that:

1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the deprivation was visited upon him by a person or persons acting under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Village of North Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court is obliged to give the plaintiff's pro se allegations, "however inartfully pleaded," a liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

Mass was incarcerated at the Kenosha County Jail at all times relevant. He is suing Kenosha County Sheriff David Beth. Mass alleges:

I was being blocked by grievance, request, appeal system to exhaust my remedies. This hurt my civil liberty in many areas. The number of request[s], grievances, appeals unanswered is pathetic. I wrote a grievance on this issue on 8-21-09 which was answered by Sgt. Berhardt on 8-24-09. I sent an appeal in which was answered by Lt Ed Vanl (or John Doe - not written well) on 8-25-09. I never received the original copy back of this appeal or any other appeal even though I asked for it back and answered. There is so much of not answered grievance request it is hard to keep track of. If I would not have been as motivated at trying to obtain what I needed I would have been blocked. The grievance forms and appeal forms even have inconsistencies that will be exhibited in court in black and white. I was also unable to obtain legal material due to unanswered grievances and I have a preponderance of evidence. They were unprofessional, period.

(Compl. ¶ IV. A.) Mass claims that the defendant maliciously blocked him from obtaining legal materials and from exhausting his remedies, causing him emotional distress and anxiety. He further claims that he was threatened for writing grievances, to try to scare him from filing them. For relief, Mass seeks \$25,000.

The Constitution guarantees prisoners a right of access to the courts. *Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996). But because that right is to access the courts rather than legal materials or law libraries, an inmate will not have a valid claim unless the prison authorities' conduct prejudiced a potentially meritorious challenge to his conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement. *Ortiz v. Downey*, 561 F.3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2009); *Bridges v. Gilbert*, 557 F.3d 541, 553 (7th Cir. 2009); *Marshall v. Knight*, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006). The prisoner,

therefore, must spell out in his complaint the connection between the alleged denial of access to the courts and the actual, nonfrivolous injury. *Christopher v. Harbury*, 536 U.S. 403, 414 (2002); *Ortiz*, 561 F.3d at 671.

The complaint allegations do not implicate the Constitution because there is no indication that Mass was injured in any way by difficulties he had filing inmate grievances. Moreover, it appears that Mass overcame these difficulties, because he alleges that the difficulties made him more motivated at getting what he needed. Finally, Mass's contention that he was threatened for writing grievances does not state a claim. First, he does not allege that he was prevented from writing grievances. Second, while a threat can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment, Dobbey v. III. Dep't of Corr., 574 F.3d 443, 445 ("imagine falsely informing a prisoner that he has been sentenced to death") (citing *Thomas v. Farley*, 31 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1994)), in this case Mass alleges that the threat was an attempt to scare him from writing a grievance, an attempt that apparently was not effective. See DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Standing alone, simple verbal harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, deprive a prisoner of a protected liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal protection of the law").

This plaintiff has provided no arguable basis for relief, having failed to make any rational argument in law or fact to support his claims. See House v. Belford, 956

F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting *Williams v. Faulkner*, 837 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket #2) be and the same is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court document that this inmate has brought an action that was dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court document that this inmate has incurred a "STRIKE" under 28 U.S.C. §1915(g).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections or his designee shall collect from the plaintiff's prison trust account the \$349.44 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from the plaintiff's prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds \$10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS ALSO ORDERED that copies of this order be sent to the warden of the institution where the inmate is confined and to Corey F. Finkelmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, P.O. Box 7857, Madison, Wisconsin, 53707-7857.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that any appeal from this matter would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) unless the plaintiff offers bona fide arguments supporting his appeal.

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 29th day of March, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

ኤP. Stadtmueller U.S. District Judge